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RECENT CAlSE NOTES
The court spiked relator's main gun by saying that it performs merely a
ministerial duty in admitting attorneys, and hence has no jurisdiction to punish
for contempt a person who practices law without being a member of the bar,
unless the act affects the functioning of the Supreme Court, since statutes pro-
vide for prosecution of such persons. 2 1
The decision leaves the trust company free to continue acts which the court
says are borderline activities, and so long as the corporation does no act which
directly interferes with the functioning of the Supreme Court, which in effect
seems to mean so long as it does not try to practice before the Supreme Court,
the only thing the bar association can do about it is to prosecute under the stat-
utes, go through a jury trial, give an opportunity for the introduction of evi-
dence, and a chance for appeal. Nothing can be done in situations such as the
instant case by way of a summary trial in a contempt proceeding. The inher-
ent power of the court to punish summarily is limited to acts which are in
actual contempt of court. What is actual contempt was not here decided-
merely that the acts charged were not such contempt.
E. A. Mc.
ToRTs-DuTy ARISING FROM CONTRACT-PRIvrrY.-The defendant, a railway
corporation, contracted with the United States for the carriage of mail. The
plaintiff's assignor, a bank, sent a package of currency through the mails. The
currency was stolen as a result of the defendant's failure to supervise the carry-
ing of the mail and to provide a mail clerk. The plaintiff insurance company
paid the loss to the bank and now seeks recovery from the defendant. Held,
the defendant did not owe the bank a duty to use reasonable care in handling
the mails because there was no privity of contract.1
The duty of exercising care may be imposed by the common law, by legis-
lative enactment, or by contract. The question then arises whether a duty to
use due care to one person, as a result of a contract, prevents the imposing of
a common law duty to others who suffer injury as a result of the negligent
performance of the contractual duty. In Winterbottom v. Wright2 the rule
was announced that a cause of action in tort did not arise from the breach of
a duty existing by virtue of contract unless there be a "privity of contract"
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Due to the development of commer-
cial relations near the end of the nineteenth century, the rule was found inap-
plicable in certain situations.
In cases where the contractual duty, even if carefully performed, involved
21Burns' Ann. Statutes, 1933, 4-3601, 4-3602, 4-3605; Ind. Const., Art. 1,
§ 13.
1 Aetna Insurance Company v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1936), 283 Ill. App.
527, 6 N. E. (2d) 189.
2 (1842) 10 Mees & W. 109, 109 Eng. Reprint 402. The rule was quickly
adopted and found application not only in personal injury claims, but also in
property damage; not only in injuries caused by physical force, but also in
injuries caused by negligent misrepresentations.
INDIA,4N LAIV JOURNA.4L
danger to human beings, the rule of privity was repudiated.S This involved
the doctrine of "inherently dangerous" instrumentalities. 4 The exception was
then extended to cover situations where the instrumentality, though not dan-
gerous in itself, was dangerous when coupled with negligent conduct. 5 A fur-
ther distinction has been made where there is negligence in respdct to the sale
of an instrumentality the result of which is likely to cause personal injury.6
But where the injury is to property instead of person some courts still adhere
to the privity doctrine. 7
Another situation involves the liability of a manufacturer or vendor of food
products. The modern weight of American authority permits a recovery by a
consumer against the manufacturer or vendor for the negligent preparation of
food for human consumption irrespective of privity.8 At first some courts found
that improperly prepared food was "inherently dangerous," 9 but the later cases
speak in terms of warranty, deceit, negligence, and common law duties.1O
8Levy v. Langridge (1838), 4 Mees. & W. 337, 150 Eng. Reprint 1458;
Thomas v. Winchester (1852), 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455; Norton v. Sewall
(1870), 106 Mass. 143, 8 Am. Rep. 298; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co. (1903), 120 Fed. 865; Fort Wayne Drug Company v. Flemion (1931), 93
Ind. App. 40, 175 N. E. 670. See Bohlen, "Liability of Manufacturer To Per-
sons Other Than Their Immediate Vendees" (1929), 45 L. Q. Rev. 343.
4 It seems that a thing is "inherently dangerous" only as a means of hold-
ing that the actor was negligent with respect to it, for the liability is imposed
not because of the thing, but because of the conduct in respect to it. In con-
formity to the rule, it has been held that if the instrumentality was not in-
herently dangerous, there would be no liability except to those in privity of
contract. Daugherty v. Herzog (1896), 145 Ind. 255, 4 N. E. 457; Laudeman
v. Russel (1910), 46 Ind. App. 32, 91 N. E. 822; Husett v. J. I. Case Threshing
Mach. Co. (1903), 120 Fed. 865. However, the result was that many things
were dubbed "inherently dangerous" in order to hold a contractor or manu-
facturer who acted negligently liable to persons not in privity of contract.
5 Delvin v. Smith (1882), 89 N. Y. 470, 42 Am. Rep. 311; Heaven v. Pender
(1883), L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 503, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 81 C. A.; Schubert v.
J. R. Clark Co. (1892), 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W. 1103; Peru Heating Co. v.
Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind. App. 319, 95 N. E. 680; Lewis v. Terry (1896), 171
Cal. 39, 49 P. 398. Contra, Travis v. Rochester Bridge Co. (1919), 188 Ind.
79, 122 N. E. 1.
6 Mr. Justice Cardozo, in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y.
382, 111 N. E. 1050: "We have put aside the notion that the duty to safe-
guard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence may be foreseen,
comes out of contract and nothing else."
7Windram Manufacturing Company v. Boston Blacking Co. (1921), 239
Mass. 123, 131 N. E. 454. See note, 28 Michigan Law Review 93.
8 Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works (1914), 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80;
Doyle v. Continental Baking Co. (1928), 262 Mass. 516; 160 N. E. 325; Salmon
v. Libby (1906), 219 Ill. 421, 76 N. E. 573; Brown Cracker Co. v. Jensen (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930), 32 S. W. (2d) 227; Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co.
(1929), 50 R. I. 43, 144 A. 884.
9 Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works (1914), 132 Tenn. 23, 177 S. W. 80.
10 Doyle v. Continental Baking Co. (1928), 262 Mass. 516, 160 N. E. 325;
Minutilla v. Providence Ice Cream Co. (1929), 50 R. I. 43, 144 A. 884. See
Perkins, "Unwholesome Feed as a Source of Liability" (1920), 5 Iowa Law
Bulletin 6, 86, 96 ff., for a full citation of cases.
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However, where there is a property damage, i. e., injury to animals, from
impure foods, the modern cases are in conflict.11
Another factual situation involves the liability of persons who prepare ab-
stracts of title, certificates, and records which are relied upon in business ac-
tivities by purchasers and mortgagees. In this field the doctrine that no cause
of action arises in tort unless there is privity of contract seems quite pre-
vailing.' 2 As a general rule, purchasers or mortgagees cannot recover from
the abstracter 'for the negligent preparation of the record.1 3 In Indiana this
rule has been relaxed where the abstracter knew that the plaintiff would take
the property as security.14 But such knowledge is a necessary allegation to
state a cause of action. 1 5
In respect to' professional inspectors and certified public accountants the
cases fall into similar categories, the great majority citing the. basic case of
Winterbottom v. Wright and refusing to impose a common law duty.' 6 But
the duty is imposed where the inspector or accountant has actual knowledge
of the plaintiff's intended use of the certificate.' 7 Thus it seems that courts
which have loquaciously repudiated the doctrine of privity in personal injury
cases have yielded to the original fear of "the means of letting in upon us an
1ITompkins v. Quaker Oats Co. (1921), 239 Mass. 147, 131 N. E. 456.
Compare Ellis v. Lindmark (Minn., 1929), 225 N. W. 395. The cases which
refuse to impose the duty here hold that the cases which do so in respect to
personal injury are inapplicable. It is submitted that there seems to be no
sound basis for this distinction. Once the duty is imposed, it would seem that
the interests in property should be protected as well as the interests in bodily
safety.
12 Ohmart v. Citizens Savings & Trust Co. (1924), 82 Ind. App. 219, 145 N.
E. 577; National Savings Bank v. Ward (1879), 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621;
Thomas v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. (1910), 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N. E. 183;
Decatur Land, Loan and Abstract Company v. Rutland (Tex. Civ. App. 1916),
185 S. W. 1064; Bremerten Development Company v. Title Trust Co. (1912),
67 Wash. 268, 121 P. 69; National Iron & Steel Company v. Hunt (1924), 312
11. 245, 143 N. E. 833; Ultramares Corporation v. Touche (1931), 255 N. Y.
170, 174 N. E. 441; Buckley v. Gray (1895), 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900; Landell
v. Lybrand (1919), 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783. Contra, Dickle v. Nashville Ab-
stract Co. (1890), 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896.
13 National Savings Bank v. Ward (1879), 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621;
Ohmart v. Citizens Savings & Trust Co. (1924), 82 Ind. App. 219, 145 N. E.
577; Thomas v. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. (1910), 81 Ohio St. 432, 91
N. E. 183.
14 Brown v. Sims (1899), 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N. E. 779.
15 Ohmart v. Citizens Savings & Trust Co. (1924), 82 Ind. App. 219, 145
N. E. 577.
16 National Iron & Steel Company v. Hunt (1924), 312 I1. 245, 145 N. E.
833; Gordon v. Livingston (1882), 12 Mo. App. 267; Ultramares Corporation
v. Touche (1931), 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441; Landel v. Lybrand (1919),
264- Pa. 406, 107 AtI. 783. f
17Glanzer v. Shepard (1922), 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275; Tardos v.
Bozant (1846), 1 La. Ann. 199. These cases expressly hold that even though a
duty to such a plaintiff might be considered as an extension of the third party
beneficiary doctrine in contract law, that nevertheless it does not derive its
source from the contract, but is one imposed by law.
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infinity of actions," as expressed in Winterbottom v. Wright, when there is a
wrongful injury to business enterprise. 1 8
In the principal case the defendant owed a contractual duty to the United
States. Nevertheless, where mail clerks or soldiers suffer personal injuries from
the negligent performance thereof, the courts have not hesitated to impose a
common law duty in favor of the injured person or his representative. 10 On
this point the courts in Illinois are in accord with the rule in Indiana and
most states.20 However, where the addressor or addressee of mails sues to
recover for loss of property or-money, caused by the negligence of the railroad
in the performance of its contract, there is a definite split of authority.2 1 Until
the decision in the principal case it was believed that the modern tendency was
to refute the privity doctrine and allow recovery to the addressor or ad-
dressee.2 2 The exact question does not appear to have been as yet decided
in Indiana.
Thus in many situations the contractual duty has not excluded the common
law duty of due care toward persons likely to be harmed. However, in case
of property damage, the courts, with a few exceptions, adhere to the privity
doctrine. But this distinction seems questionable. The principal reason ad-
vanced in Winterbottom v. Wright was the danger of a multitude of actions
and liability to an indeterminate number of plaintiffs. 2 3 To this objection the
rule that a plaintiff to recover must be within the class of persons reasonably
exposed to the danger of the defendant's misconduct seems a sufficient answer.2 4
18 Compare the opinions of Mr. Justice Cardozo, in the cases of MacPher-
son v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050, and Glanzer
v. Shepard (1922), 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275, with that in Ultramares Cor-
poration v. Touche (1931), 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441. No reported case,
among the few jurisdictions which have totally abolished the privity doctrine,
has been found which complains of the courts being burdened with actions
by plaintiffs who were within the class of persons likely to be harmed by the
malfeasance of a contract duty.
1: Barker v. Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis R. Co. (1909), 243 I11. 482, 90
N. E. 1057; Malott v. Central Trust Co. (1906), 168 Ind. 428, 79 N. E. 369;
Seybolt v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. (1884), 95 N. Y. 562, 47 Am. Rep.
75; Mellor v. Missouri R. R. Co. (l91), 105 Mo. 455, 16 S. W. 849.
20 Barker v. Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis R. Co. (1909), 243 II. 482, 90 N.
E. 1057; Malott v. Central Trust Co. (1906), 168 Ind. 428, 79 N. E. 369; Cleve-
land, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v Ketcham (1892), 133 Ind 346, 33 N. E. 116.
21 Compare Skaggs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (1934), 228 Mo. App.
808, 73 S. W. (2d) 302; Central Railroad & B. Co. v. Lampley (1884), 76 Ala.
357, 52 Am. Rep. 334; Sawyer v. Corse (1867), 17 Gratt. (Va.) 230, 94 Am.
Dec. 445, with Boston Insurance Company v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. (1902),
118 Iowa 423, 92 N. W. 88; German State Bank v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M. Ry. Co. (1901), C. C. A., 113 Fed. 414; Corwell v. Vorhees (1844), 13
Ohio 523, 42 Am. Dec. 206.
22 Skaggs v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. (1934), 228 Mo. App. 808, 73
S. W. (2d) 302. See full citation of cases in 51 A. L. R. 198. The lower appel-
late court in the principal case, after reviewing all the authorities, took this
position, following the Missouri case above. See Aetna Insurance Company v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1936), 283 IIl. App. 527, 6 N. E. (2d) 189.
23 See opinion of Lord Abinger,. in Winterbottom v. Wright (1842), 10
Mees & W. 109, 109 Eng. Reprint 402. Accord, judge Cordozo, in Ultramares
v. Touche (1931), 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441.2 4 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co. (128), 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99. See
further, 59 A. L. R. 1253.
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This is a basic principle in the analysis of all torts. Therefore the law sets
the limits upon the number of plaintiffs who can sue. Further, can the parties
by contract change tort law? The cases are definitely in the negative.2 5
Also, if a liability exists for gratuitous negligent conduct 2 6 undertaken for
another, it is difficult -to justify non-liability for conduct undertaken for a
consideration. Since Winterbottom v. Wright the increase in specialized activ-
ity engaged in under contract requires a revaluation of the relations of the
participants. 2 7 In many transactions involving banks, loan companies, pur-
chasers, and senders of mail matter, reliance in fact must be placed upon the
reasonably careful conduct of abstracters, inspectors, and mail contractors.
Thus, it is believed that the jurisdictions 2 8 which refuse the doctrine of Win-
terbottom v. Wright in cases of property damage as well as personal injury
cases announce the more desirable rule.
H. L. T.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD IN THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY.-The
plaintiff, Sarah L. Pedaltry, contracted with the defendant company's agent to
purchase certain lots, the agent representing that he would resell the lots for
her immediately at a profit. At the time of making the contract plaintiff turned
over to defendant stocks as security for payment of the purchase price and a
contract she held to purchase another lot. The lots were never sold for her.
Later she contracted with a third party to purchase less valuable property for
which her interest in these lots was taken as part payment. In an action for
damages for fraud and deceit, plaintiff alleged that the defendant's agent made
the false representations about procuring a purchaser in order to get her
stock and sought to recover as damages its value plus interest. The trial court
awarded plaintiff a judgment for $16,997.64-. On appeal the Appellate Court
reversed the decision and remanded it for a new trial, holding that she was
not entitled to recover for fraud and deceit in absence of a showing of value,
if any, of the property which she received in exchange for her contract with
the defendant, notwithstanding her testimony that she had "lost everything."1
The promise of a vendor to resell property at a profit for a purchaser in
order to induce him to buy and without any intention of performing is fraud.2
25 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y. 382; 111 N. E. 1050;
Glanzer v. Shepard (1922), 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275; Dickle v. Nashville
Abstract Co. (1890), 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896.
26 Coggs v. Bernard (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 27 Eng. Rul. Cas. 288; Nol-
ton v. Western R. Corp. (1857), 15 N. Y. 444, 69 Am. Dec., 623; Gregor v.
Cady (1889), 82 Me. 131, 19 A..108.
27 This is true not only as between the contracting parties and strangers,
but also as between the parties themselves. See the demand for liability on the
independent contractee for injuries occasioned by the negligent actions of inde-
pendent contractors in non-hazardous activity. Clarence Morris, The Torts
of an Independent Contractor (1934), 29 Ill. Law Rev. 339; Roscoe T. Steffen,
Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935), 2 U. of Chicago Law Rev.
501.
28Ellis v. Lindmark (Minn., 1929), 225 N. W. 395; Dickle v. Nashville
Abstract Co. (1890), 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896; Skaggs v. Missour-Kansas-
Texas R. Co. (1934), 228 Mo. App. 808, 73 S. W. (2d) 302.
1 Pedaltry v. George F. Nixon & Co. (11., 1937), 6 N. E. (2d) 290.
2 Boulevard Land Company v. King (Cal. App., 1932), 13 P. (2d) 864.
